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Abstract. The Freedom Budget for All Americans, written under the supervision of Bayard 
Rustin and released in 1966 by the A. Philip Randolph Institute, was a well developed 
policy program to secure full economic citizenship for all Americans thanks to an 
unprecedented government investment. The program challenged the classic definition of 
civil rights and linked increased government spending to economic justice.  It never earned 
traction and remained at the margins of historical memory by the end of the Johnson 
Presidency. The recent literature on the Freedom Budget focuses on its ideological milieu 
and political implications and identifies the strategic errors in coalition building as the main 
cause of the Freedom Budget defeat. This paper concentrates on a specific element of the 
plan, the notion of economic equality, and states that the disagreement between radicals and 
liberals on such a notion ultimately caused the undoing of the coalition. 
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1. Introduction 
he Freedom Budget for All Americans: Budgeting Our Resources, 1966-
1975, To Achieve Freedom from Want (also, Freedom Budget or simply 
Budget), a policy program issued by the A. Philip Randolph Institute in fall 
1966 under the supervision of A. Philip Randolph himself and Bayard Rustin, was 
created to eradicate unemployment and poverty in the United States.i Despite the 
endorsement of more than 200 prominent public figures, from John Kenneth 
Galbraith to Stokely Carmichael, and support from leaders of the NAACP, CORE, 
SNCC, Urban League and SCLC, commitment from President Johnson and 
Congress never materialized, and the plan failed to be transformed into a concrete 
legislative proposal (Randolph Institute, 1966).ii Almost completely neglected by 
scholars, and thus removed from collective memory, the policy program has been 
recently rediscovered by Paul Le Blanc and Michael D. Yates. These authors 
publish their A Freedom Budget for All Americans: Recapturing the Promise of the 
Civil Rights Movement in the Struggle for Economic Justice Today, writing about 
the origins and legacy of the program and rescuing it from an unjustified historical 
obscurity (Le Blanc & Yates, 2013).iii When it comes to a retrospective view to the 
Freedom Budget, the core of Le Blanc’s and Yates’s message is that, if approved, a 
modest investment of $20 billion a year for a period of ten years would have 
‚fundamentally changed the course of U.S. history‛ (Le Blanc, 2013).iv For the 
authors, the program was economically feasible; unfortunately, it was politically 
non feasible. They identify in the political dynamics of that age – black radicalism, 
peace movement, new right – the source of the disaggregating forces that impaired 
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the efforts of Randolph and Rustin to build a progressive coalition around the 
Freedom Budget.  
This paper takes a different approach. It focuses on the main goal of the Budget, 
full employment, and its underlying notion of economic equality, that is, equality 
of result. This paper states that it was the inherent idea of equality of result that was 
rejected by President Johnson and his administration, rendering the Freedom 
Budget unacceptable and ultimately causing the undoing of the coalition. First, this 
paper addresses the recent scholarly work that has uncovered the largely forgotten 
history of the Freedom Budget, focusing on its ideological milieu and political 
implications and identifying the strategic errors in coalition building as the main 
cause of the Freedom Budget defeat. Second, this paper locates the ambitious goal 
of full employment at the heart of the Freedom Budget in the context of the 
intellectual debate on equality of opportunity v. equality of result of those times. 
Finally, this paper addresses the perplexities of President Johnson, and liberals in 
his administration, to the ‚socialist‛ notion of equality of result.  
 
2. The Freedom Budget 
After achieving monumental fame in the civil rights movement as the organizer 
of the 1963 March on Washington, at the time the largest nonviolent protest ever 
held in the United States, Bayard Rustin joined the AFL-CIO’s A. Phillip Randolph 
Institute – a black trade unionist center funded to facilitate convergence between 
labor and civil rights. He became Executive Director in 1965, seeking to realize the 
vision of universal economic rights articulated in his article ‚From Protest to 
Politics‛ (Rustin, 1966).v The article became the ideological foundation of the 
Freedom Budget, an articulated plan aimed primarily at eradicating poverty and 
joblessness and significantly expanding the boundaries of Johnson’s Great Society. 
The plan, a collective project of economists, labor unions, and civil rights leaders, 
was coordinated by Rustin, although Leon H. Keyserling wrote it almost single-
handedly; it was finally presented at a press conference in Harlem’s Salem 
Methodist Church in October 1966 as an 84-page document, complete with 
statistics, charts, graphs, and a discussion of methodology.vi It called on the federal 
government to spend $185 billion over a ten-year period to restore and maintain 
full employment, guaranteeing an adequate income for all employed and a 
minimum adequate income to all who could not be so employed.  
The Freedom Budget, at least in the minds of its authors, was an ambitious civil 
rights proposal at the intersection of racial justice and economic justice for all 
Americans. It projected ‚the practical liquidation of poverty in the U.S. by 1975‛ 
while it left ‚no room for discrimination in any form‛ (Randolph Institute, 1966).vii 
Ideally supported by a progressive coalition of civil rights movement and labor 
unions, African Americans and other minorities, young liberals, students, and 
progressive-minded religious communities, the Freedom Budget would have the 
magnitude, if successfully implemented, to ‚radically alter the relationship of 
government to the economy, and establish a commitment to democratic 
planning.‛viii The plan was a remarkable piece of public policy, a list of social 
priorities that involved housing, education, and employment, as well as guaranteed 
annual income and expansions of medical care, and social insurance. The plan  
would also engage the poor in rebuilding their own cities and ghettos, with the 
federal government financing the construction of homes, schools, mass transit, and 
hospitals, as well as providing useful services such as healthcare and teachers' 
aides.  
The Freedom Budget occupies a special place in the history of the civil rights 
movement. First, the program belongs to the second wave of civil rights activism, 
when the movement went well beyond overturning Jim Crow segregation laws in 
the South and regaining voting rights and full citizenship rights for African 
Americans. Civil rights leaders instead focused on transforming America to bring 
economic justice to all unemployed and poor people, regardless of race. Second, 
the plan set the bar incredibly high: the goal of the project was to end poverty and 
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unemployment throughout the United States within a ten-year period, that is, by 
1975, just in time for the bicentennial. Third, the project was actually an economic 
plan, worked out by New Deal Keynesian economists such as Leon H. Keyserling, 
former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the Truman 
Administration, with detailed charts, graphs, and statistics. It was an economic plan, 
a formal statement of a set of business goals, including full employment and 
minimum wage, the reasons the goals were believed attainable, and the action steps 
for reaching those goals. The Freedom Budget  also contained the numbers and 
terms reflective of the financial resources necessary to achieve the plan’s goals 
($185 billion over a ten-year period) and the sources of funding (a so-called 
‚growth dividend‛).ix Finally, the Freedom Budget was conceived to be adopted by 
a progressive coalition of liberal and student activists, trade unionists, and religious 
and civil rights leaders and then transformed into legislative activity with the 
commitment of mainstream liberalism and the endorsement of the Johnson 
administration. Despite a popularized 20-page summary (which contained an 
introduction by Martin Luther King), prepared and distributed through a grass-
roots mobilization, and a vast and prestigious network, the Freedom Budget never 
earned  traction and was entirely off of the radar by 1967 (King, 1967).x 
Two reasons are typically blamed for the failure (Le Blanc & Yates, 2013; 
D’Emilio, 2003).xi  The expected progressive coalition envisioned by Randolph and 
Rustin never materialized due to the realignment to the right of the American 
electorate during the 1966 midterm elections. On the left, the sharper polarization 
over Black Power enlarged the gulf between radicals and liberals that Rustin aimed 
to fill. Reacting to a changed political environment, Rustin pointedly contrasted his 
vision with what many Black Power activists had come to perceive as the separatist 
strategy of Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael, alienating their support and 
hurting his reputation.xii Moreover, the rise of the protest against the Vietnam War 
made inevitable the choice between guns and butter – a choice that Randolph and 
Rustin were unable to make, because they were unwilling to break with the 
Johnson administration. This refusal to confront military spending is explicit in the 
official summary of the Freedom Budget, which says, ‚No skimping on national 
defense.‛ Although the statement protected the plan from the criticism of 
mainstream liberals increasingly entrapped in the spending priorities associated 
with the Vietnam War, it left Freedom Budget-fighters vulnerable to the 
denunciation of the anti-war protesters. Moreover, the plan’s architects isolated 
themselves from the growing antiwar movement, which was attracting the same 
army of supporters that Rustin and Randolph considered the Budget’s natural 
constituency. In other words, the Freedom Budget evaded the biggest issue facing 
the country in the mid- to late-1960s, the Vietnam War, and did not address the 
implication of the growing military spending to the goals of full employment and 
economic justice. Despite Rustin’s and Randolph’s policy of appeasement, the 
Johnson administration and the liberal Congressional leadership remained 
noncommittal on the Freedom Budget (Le Blanc & Yates, 2013).xiii Ultimately, 
Randolph and Rustin never reached the level of political relevance for which they 
aimed. 
  
3. Equality of Opportunity v. Equality of Results 
The economic growth and the rising expectation of economic justice in the 
1960s instigated a profound shift in American culture that spurred workplace 
integration like never before. As a practical solution to job discrimination, civil 
rights leaders envisioned a mix of policies of fair employment and preferential 
treatment thanks to government’s expanded role. Accordingly, both strategies, fair 
employment and quotas, equality of opportunity and equality of result, became 
interchangeable and were pursued simultaneously. On one side, there was a 
concentrated effort on the part of civil rights leaders, labor unions, federal 
government, and some employers to integrate the nation’s workplaces. They were 
supportive of, sometimes advocates for, fair employment practices legislations 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 4(1), E. Beltramini,  p.55-66. 
58 
through coalitions of interests, legal actions, and moral suasion. On the other side, 
often the same civil rights leaders, alone or in cooperation with the black clergy or 
black nationalists, socialists and radicals, were promoting grass-roots protests and 
pursuing preferential treatment strategies through a widespread use of boycotts to 
force employers to hire, promote, and advance African Americans. A case in point 
is the S.C.L.C., which lobbied for civil rights legislation and fair employment 
practices and a color-blind legislation while simultaneously seeking to establish 
Operation Breadbasket, a color-conscious campaign. S.C.L.C. also promoted 
vibrant boycott campaigns and mass protests to secure more, and better, jobs for 
African Americans by leveraging the economic power of their community.  
In 1963, the idea that some sort of ‚affirmative action‛ might be implemented 
was elaborated on by civil rights and labor leaders. In his book Why We Can’t 
Wait, King pointed out:  
The nation must not only radically readjust its attitude toward [African 
Americans] in the compelling present, but must incorporate in its planning 
some compensatory consideration for the handicaps [African Americans 
have] inherited from the past. It is impossible to create a formula for the 
future, which does not take into account that our society has done something 
special against [African Americans] for hundreds of years. How then can 
[African Americans] be absorbed into the mainstream of American life if we 
do not do something special for [them] now, in order to balance the equation 
and equip [them] to compete on a just and equal basis? Whenever this issue 
of compensatory or preferential treatment for [African Americans] is raised, 
some of our friends recoil in horror. [African Americans] should be granted 
equality, they agree; but [they] should ask nothing more. On the surface, this 
appears reasonable, but it is not realistic. For it is obvious that if a [person] 
entered at the starting line in a race three hundred years after another 
[person], the [latter] would have to perform some impossible feat in order to 
catch up with his fellow runner (Chappell, 2014).xiv 
Rather than ‚compensatory treatment,‛ Randolph argued in the same period that 
‚special and preferential treatment, in the form of preparation in training and 
education to enable it (Negro labor) effectively to move forward.‛ The point also 
resonated with the New York Commission on Human Rights that included the 
option of ‚preferential treatment‛ of ‚qualified‛ blacks ‚for a limited period.‛ An 
editor of Fortune magazine, Charles E. Silberman, considered it, ‚Inevitable in 
1963 that Negro organizations would use their power to increase job opportunities 
for Negroes. Indeed, Negroes are not content with equal opportunity anymore; they 
are demanding preference, or ‘positive discrimination’ in their favor‛ (Hamilton & 
Hamilton, 1997).xv He was correct. The statement that detailed the compromise that 
ended protests in Birmingham (‘‘The Birmingham Truce Agreement,’’ 10 May 
1963) explicitly mentioned an ongoing ‘‘program of upgrading Negro 
employment,’’ which meant awarding set numbers of jobs to eligible black 
applicants (Carson, 1954).xvi 
Job discrimination, according to the labor unions and civil rights leaders that 
focused their attention on the economic problems of working-class and 
unemployed African Americans, was a part of a ubiquitous, systematic, devastating 
economic inequality. That inequality began at home, where black children were 
trapped in segregated neighborhoods with little access to medical care and high 
rates of illness; the situation extended to school, where black students received an 
education inferior to their white counterparts. Black students were denied access to 
advanced education and training and ultimately marginalized from the intellectual 
milieu; in this regard, the National Urban League stressed ‚the damaging effects of 
generations of deprivation and denial‛ on blacks. The main barrier to defeating 
economic inequality was whites’ perception that equality had been already 
achieved. As reported by historian MacLean, in 1963, half of Southern whites and 
45 percent of Northern whites stated that blacks already had ‚as good a chance‛ as 
whites ‚to get any kind of job for which they are qualified‛ (MacLean, 2006).xvii A 
black-excluding job system was perpetuating itself and creating the false 
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perception that it was the natural order of things. The complexity and the 
magnitude of the job discrimination phenomenon created space for more extensive 
remedies. What was needed to overcome the preferential system that had benefited 
whites for generations was a ‚special effort.‛ Whitney Young, the national director 
of the National Urban League, conceded that ‚the concept of special effort for 
Negro citizens may be difficult for the majority of white citizens to accept‛ 
(Young, 1964). xviii  The notion of ‚special effort‛ (or Domestic Marshall Plan) 
gained consensus mostly because in the United States, the post-World War II 
period was one of economic prosperity (King, 1964) xix  Randolph adopted this 
expression, ‚Fair employment and full employment,‛ which allowed the two 
options – ‚fair‛ and ‚full‛ -- as contradictory as they may be, to be considered as 
complementary (Randolph, 1959).xx The vision of full employment backed by the 
government, which labor union and civil right leaders shared in the first part of the 
Sixties, would eventually emerge as the unifying proposal between the two options 
of fair employment and quotas.  
 
4. Equality of Results and Liberals 
The Budget’s promoters concern about the economics of full employment and 
other features of economic justice is well documented in Le Blanc and Yates’s 
book, and elsewhere. In reviewing Randolph’s speech at the Conference on the 
Civil Rights Revolution, held in Washington, D.C. for two days following the 1963 
March on Washington and sponsored by the Socialist Party, independent journalist 
I. F. Stone noted that 
The direction in which full emancipation lies was indicated when Mr. 
Randolph spoke of the need to extend the public sector of the economy. His 
brilliant assistant on the March, Bayard Rustin, urged an economic master 
plan to deal with the technological unemployment that weighs so heavily on 
the Negro and threatens to create a permanently depressed class of whites and 
blacks living precariously on the edges of an otherwise affluent society. It 
was clear from the discussion that neither tax cuts nor public works nor job 
training (for what jobs?) would solve the problem while automation with 
giant steps made so many workers obsolete. The civil rights movement, Mr. 
Rustin said, could not get beyond a certain level unless it merged into a 
broader plan for social change (Stone, 2006). xxi 
Facing the prospective of structural unemployment, a type of unemployment 
due to structural and technological change, which can hardly be resolved through 
the usual Keynesian fiscal stimulus to the private sector, Rustin was adamant in 
advocating ‚massive public work investment,‛ a move that would go beyond the 
private sector being pumped up by government expenditure. He asked the 
government to provide jobs directly to those whom the private sector could no 
longer employ. ‚We should be demanding immediate passage of an accelerated 
public works program,‛ Rustin stated in 1965 (Rustin, 1965).xxii  
The Freedom Budget was a byproduct of Rustin’s strategic shift. Legal equality 
and political freedom were only the premises of economic justice; the final purpose 
of racial justice for African-Americans and, at greater scale, of economic justice for 
all Americans, required nothing short of institutional change. This change 
depended on whether ‚a coalition of progressive forces … becomes the effective 
political majority‛ (Rustin, 1965). xxiii  Rustin recognized that the progressive 
coalition he envisioned was linked to a double transformation, the transformation 
of mainstream liberalism – say, the Democratic Party – in an intransigent advocate 
of economic justice, and the transformation of the civil rights movement in a 
disciplined and reliable partner of the establishment. It was the best of both worlds 
(the power of the liberal institutions and the energy of the grass-roots mobilization) 
converging in a unified effort to obliterate poverty and to eradicate racism. In 
preparing the Freedom Budget, Rustin had these two streams of activity in mind: 
attracting support from liberal institutions and pressuring those institutions though 
a populist campaign.  Accordingly, Rustin called upon the activist wing of the civil 
rights movement to walk the line and become part of the system, while playing the 
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role of the outsider by pressing the institutions. The anti-system stance had to be 
left to radicals and nationalists. His formula for protesters was that they join 
mainstream politics without leaving the streets; that way, they would influence 
policy and yet maintain an ‚outsider‛ identity. It was an interesting evolution in his 
political vision, although an inherent contradiction that became a source of the 
plan’s ultimate failure. 
The political coalition that was supposed to emerge around the Freedom Budget 
never materialized. The economic plan attracted the support not only of the 
‚activist‛ civil rights groups – SCLC, SNCC and CORE – but from the more 
moderate NAACP and Urban League and a broad range of labor and liberal 
organizations (including George Meany, the conservative head of the AFL-CIO) 
and individuals (economists and intellectuals, labor and civil rights leaders) who 
identified themselves as reformers (King, 1966). xxiv  For a short time between 
October 1966 and September 1967, the Freedom Budget became the pinnacle of 
the civil rights movement, a ‚Marshall Plan‛ to eradicate poverty and 
discrimination in America, before it ran out of steam and pushed to the margins of 
historical memory by the end of the 1960s. One main reason of this irrelevance lies 
in President Johnson’s understanding of ‚economic equality.‛ The economic views 
and priorities of his administration diverged from those of the Freedom Budget as 
far as the very meaning of ‚civil rights.‛ In September 1964, Johnson gave 
Randolph a Medal of Freedom, but later he remained silent on the Freedom Budget. 
For several reasons, Johnson was unhappy with the plan and its proponents. First, 
he was hurt that at the planning session of the White House conference on civil 
rights entitled ‚To Fulfill These Rights,‛ held on November 17, 1965, Randolph 
tried to steal the show. The conference was originally conceived as a path toward 
acknowledging President Johnson’s contributions to the case of racial justice, but 
Randolph seized the opportunity to instead challenge the limitations of Johnson’s 
Poverty Program and to propose the remedy as ‚the creation of a vast ‘freedom 
budget,’ a nationwide plan for the abolition of the ghetto jungles in every city, even 
at the cost of a hundred billion dollars.‛ The president was incensed (Randolph, 
1965).xxv Second, Johnson’s attitude was that all black leaders, including activists 
such as Martin Luther King, Jr., should praise him for all he had done rather than 
asking what the President was going to do next for them or reprimanding him about 
the Vietnam War. From Johnson’s point of view, the black leaders (with the 
exception of Whitney Young) were simply ungrateful. Third, Johnson and his 
administration were outraged by the idea of a $185 billion Freedom Budget and 
admittedly confused about its target. On the latter point, Abram, who coordinated 
part of the preparatory work for the conference together with Bill Coleman, 
remembers that  
Interestingly enough, A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin never asked 
for a hundred billion dollars for blacks. They asked for a freedom budget for 
all who needed it.  It was not a quota, it was not a subsidy [?], it was to lift 
the tide of the poor and on that rising tide all men would come in. It was not 
racially oriented. 
Rustin and Randolph had hoped that the shift from race to civil rights would 
soften Johnson, as the program addressed the economic problems of all Americans. 
Abram reveals that the White House understood perfectly the purpose of the 
Budget, but that the administration remained puzzled by the fact that the black 
leaders were asking for funds to finance an economic program not racially oriented. 
Why are they speaking about the poverty tout court, rather than focusing on civil 
rights for blacks? The answer for Abram was that the black leaders were not 
talking as such, but as socialists (Abram, 1984).xxvi   
A point of disagreement between the liberal administration and the Freedom 
Budget’s proponents was on the notion of ‚equality.‛ The general premises of the 
Great Society and the Freedom Budget were the same: economic growth was 
sufficient to bring prosperity to all. Growth finances social programs to advance 
those left behind by prosperity; however, civil rights leaders believed that 
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American society needed radical change and that capitalism was unable to deliver 
economic justice: the problems of poverty and minority unemployment might be 
solved – in King’s words - with ‚public service employment for those less able to 
compete in the labor market‛ and income guarantees for those unable to 
‚participate in the job economy‛ (King, 1966).xxvii In contrast, liberals strongly 
believed that capitalism was fundamentally sound and only in need of specific 
reforms and adjustments in order to provide opportunity to everyone. The Great 
Society was essentially a liberal plan in which government had the competence and 
the resources to help people help them selves. It sought to advance equality of 
opportunity, not to establish equality of social condition (Patterson, 1996).xxviii The 
government was in place to guarantee the minority and poor population the right to 
have the same opportunities as anyone else-- to be hired, promoted, and to obtain a 
better salary; the system was not in place to provide equality of result. The fact is, 
most mainstream liberals clearly saw the Freedom Budget as too radical because it 
supported equality of result.    
Herein lies Johnson’s understanding of the Freedom Budget as a socialist 
program repackaged as civil right advancement. Abram is adamant – and here he 
seems to speak for the President – that the Freedom Budget was not civil rights. 
Abram notes that Johnson was unhappy with Rustin ‚who wanted to convert the 
Civil Rights Movement into a socialist experiment. That is, not necessarily make 
the country socialist, but a vast expenditure program‛ (Abram, 1984).xxix He was 
probably right. The Freedom Budget was basically a socialist program created by 
the socialist ‚ideological orientation‛ of its promoters (in particular Randolph, 
Rustin, and King, Jr.), while the Budget’s political goal was the redirection of the 
civil rights movement to act as a catalyst of a progressive coalition. The Budget’s 
economic assumption was the very notion of public service employment, a 
government that complements the private sector in achieving and maintaining full 
employment (Le Blanc & Yates, 2013).xxx The promoters of the Budget specifically 
framed the plan as a vehicle to shift the center of gravity of American politics. The 
idea was to go well beyond Johnson’s maneuvering and the limitations of the 
President’s War on Poverty and Great Society and to ignite a fundamental change 
of the power structures in U.S. politics and in the economy. In fashioning their 
economic plan message, Bayard and his colleagues expected a coalition of 
Democratic left-liberals and socialists to converge on the basic principles of full 
employment, end of poverty, and universal access to adequate education and health 
care. A left-leaning Democratic majority was at that point supposed to emerge in 
the political landscape to isolate the moderate wing of the Democratic party to one 
side and the third-party supporters and racial radicals to the other.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Scholars have recently offered a political interpretation of the Freedom 
Budget’s demise. They closely identify its defeat with strategic mistakes within the 
U.S. left liberalism and reformism. This paper, however, makes it clear that other 
factors were at stake. First, when Randolph and Rustin introduced the Budget in 
the political conversation, they discovered the limits of their strategy: a progressive 
coalition could be built only by avoiding divisive issues. But the very idea at the 
core of the Budget-that of full employment - was divisive. The whole notion of a 
massive economic program, promoted by socialists in the efforts to reach equality 
of results, was divisive. The Budget’s proponents misunderstood Johnson’s basic 
conviction and the liberal establishment’s commitment to promote equality of 
result. The bottom line is that the same notion of equality of result, which was the 
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